The political economy of income distribution: industry level evidence from 14 OECD countries by Guschanski, Alexander & Onaran, Özlem
1 
 
 The political economy of income distribution:  
industry level evidence from 14 OECD 
countries 
 
Alexander Guschanski and Özlem Onaran 
University of Greenwich 
 
Abstract 
This article presents an econometric estimation of the determinants of the wage share, using 
sectoral data for 14 OECD countries for the period 1970- 2014. We present estimations for 
the wage share of high- and low-skilled workers and within manufacturing and service 
industries. We augment sectoral data with input-output tables and union density data to 
obtain detailed estimations of the effect of technological change, globalisation and bargaining 
power on the wage share.  
We find a significant negative effect of globalisation and we discover offshoring to emerging 
markets to be a robust driver of this process. Technological change had an impact which 
differs by skill group, but theoretical issues and lack of robustness of the results cast doubt 
on the hypothesis of skill-biased technological change as a key factor in the overall decline in 
the wage share. Furthermore, we find a robust effect of institutional factors such as union 
density and minimum wages on the wage share, lending strong support to the political 
economy approach to functional income distribution. 
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1. Introduction  
There has been a significant decline in the share of wages in GDP in both developed and 
developing countries since the 1980s. This was accompanied by another trend towards 
greater inequality in personal income distribution, particularly by increases in income shares 
of the top 1% of the distribution (Atkinson, et al., 2011). These developments indicate a clear 
reversal of the trends towards relatively egalitarian income distribution during the post-war 
era. This article presents an econometric analysis of the determinants of the wage share 
(labour compensation as a ratio to value added) using sectoral data for selected OECD 
countries.    
Previous research has highlighted the impact of technological change, 
financialisation, globalisation, changes in government policy, and labour market institutions 
to explain the decline in the wage share (IMF, 2017; EC, 2007; Stockhammer, 2016). Since 
many of those factors are either determined on a sectoral level or have developed differently 
across sectors, a sector level analysis has advantages over previous research that uses 
country-level data. Furthermore, it allows to focus on the decline of the within sector wage 
share, which was the main driver of the trend of increasing inequality in functional income 
distribution  (IMF, 2017; Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2014).  
We compile a comprehensive sector-level dataset for 14 OECD countries (Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, the UK, the US) for the period of 1970- 20141, which allows us to trace the 
developments of the wage share across high- and low-skilled sectors, between high-, 
medium-, and low-skilled workers and within manufacturing and service industries. A 
thorough analysis of the service sectors which are gaining increasing importance is a novelty 
of this study. The use of additional data sources such as input-output tables and collective 
bargaining data, which were not fully exploited in the previous research, allows us to obtain 
detailed estimations of the effect of globalisation, in particular offshoring, and bargaining 
power on the wage share. Finally, we use a dynamic panel data estimation technique that 
takes the endogeneity of our core variables into account, and present new insights into the 
potential bias in the previous research that focuses on technological change as the main driver 
of the decline in the wage share. 
                                                 
1 The time period is determined by data availability at a detailed sectoral level. 
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Our results indicate that the decline in the wage share can be attributed to 
globalisation and a decline in bargaining power of labour, however, we find that these factors 
impact skill groups differently. While we also find evidence for a negative impact of 
technological change, the effect seems to be less significant since the mid-1990s. In contrast, 
factors accounting for globalisation and bargaining power exhibit a robust impact. Our 
findings suggest that mainstream models assuming optimising behaviour of firms with full 
knowledge of their cost and demand functions perform poorly in explaining the trends in the 
recent decades. These results imply that the increase in income inequality is not an inevitable 
outcome of technological change but can be altered by collective bargaining institutions and 
fiscal policies.  
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
theoretical and empirical literature with an aim to pin down the effects of technology, 
globalisation, and changes in the bargaining power of labour on functional income 
distribution. Section 3 presents our estimation methodology and specifications. Section 4 
introduces our data and stylised facts. Section 5 presents the estimation results and section 6 
concludes.  
2. Determinants of the wage share: different theories and empirical 
evidence  
The neoclassical approach to the determinants of income distribution, which also forms the 
basis for the New Keynesian analysis, starts from a production function with capital and 
labour. In a fully competitive market with optimising firms, factors will be remunerated 
according to their marginal product. Under these assumptions the labour share can be 
expressed as a function of the capital-output ratio and capital augmenting technological 
change. However, if unions bargain over employment as well as wages (i.e. there are 
imperfections in the labour market), an increase in their bargaining power will increase the 
wage share for a given capital-output ratio (Bentolila & Saint-Paul, 2003). 2,3  
Recent literature emphasises how technological progress in the last decades was 
driven by Information and Communication Technology (ICT), that allowed to replace 
                                                 
2 The case of imperfections in the product market (e.g. oligopolistic competition) is equivalent, resulting in a 
negative relation between the degree of concentration and the wage share (Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014).  
3 However, if firms set employment after the wage has been decided, bargaining power of workers will not alter 
the relationship between the wage share and the capital-output ratio. Put differently, while unions might succeed 
in increasing the real wage, this will induce a substitution of labour by capital and therefore increase the capital-
output ratio. This will increase the wage share if the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is less 
than one.  
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workers by machines for tasks that are easily automatized (Goos, et al., 2014) and contributed 
to a decline in the price of capital relative to labour which led to an increase in the capital-
output ratio (Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2014). The neoclassical framework, expects a 
negative (positive) effect of technological progress or an increase in the capital-output ratio 
on the wage share if capital acts as a gross substitute (complement) for labour (i.e. if the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is larger (smaller) than one). It is usually 
assumed that capital is a substitute for unskilled labour, whereas it complements skilled 
workers.  
The effect of globalisation on income distribution, has also been widely researched, 
with an increasing focus on offshoring within sectors (Feenstra, et al., 1997; Grossman & 
Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). Firms in capital abundant countries offshore labour intensive tasks in 
order to benefit from the lower wages in labour abundant countries (IMF, 2017). This 
emphasises the need to distinguish between different destinations of offshoring. While this 
process increases profits, it depends on the elasticity of substitution whether it will translate 
into an increase of the profit share. Similarly, Feenstra (2007) suggests that wages of high 
skilled workers will increase while those of low-skilled workers will decline in labour- as 
well as capital-abundant countries. The impact on the wage share in such a scenario is 
ambiguous and depends on the relative size of the effects. Focusing on the financial side of 
globalisation, IMF (2017) argues that larger financial inflows may lower the relative cost of 
capital with ambiguous effects on the wage share. Importantly for our empirical analysis, the 
effects of globalisation discussed above are enacted through a change in the price of capital 
and labour, and should therefore be reflected in the capital-output ratio. Consequently, if 
globalisation has an impact on the wage share for a given capital-output ratio, this effect 
reflects a change in relative bargaining power of capital vis-à-vis labour. For example, 
deregulation of trade barriers might increase the mobility of capital by reducing relocation 
costs and thereby increase the credibility of the firing threat for workers (e.g. Harrison, 2002; 
Jayadev, 2007). Since increasing trade openness usually benefits the more mobile factor, we 
expect a negative effect of globalisation on the wage share. 
Furthermore, globalisation can put domestic workers in direct competition with 
foreign workers through an increase in migration. The impact of labour migration on the 
wage share is theoretically ambiguous. Previous research has shown that migration is 
positively linked to productivity (Huber, et al., 2010), with the ambiguous effects discussed 
above. The effects also depend on whether migrants substitute or complement natives. 
Moreover, if unions and other institutions protecting labour rights are weak, leading to a 
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segmented labour market, lower wages paid to migrants may have a negative impact on the 
wage share. 
 
The theories in the tradition of political economy4 have a different approach to the 
determinants of functional income distribution as they reject the assumption of well-behaved 
aggregate production functions and marginalist pricing (Lavoie, 2014). Indeed, empirical 
studies suggest that firms apply a version of cost-plus pricing (Melmiès, 2010). This implies 
that competition is not perfect and firms have some degree of market power. The most 
commonly used version is mark-up pricing, where a mark-up is charged on average variable 
costs such as wages (Kalecki, 1954). The mark-up, in turn, determines the wage share. This 
approach is consistent with certain insights that emerge from the neoclassical framework. For 
example, if firms have a certain profit rate target an increase in the capital stock will be 
associated with a higher mark-up to increase profits and keep the profit rate constant (Lavoie, 
2014:162-163). This creates a negative relation between the capital-output ratio and the wage 
share, irrespective of substitution between capital and labour.  
There is a large literature on the determinants of the mark-up in the Political Economy 
tradition. Kalecki (1954) claims that workers bargaining power and social norms will 
determine the mark-up. Distributional conflict about income shares will work via increases in 
prices. In a situation where unions manage to increase nominal wages, firms could increase 
prices equivalently, thus keeping the wage share constant. In order to avoid this inflationary 
spiral capital and labour will settle for a mark-up that is deemed acceptable by both parties.  
In the political economy framework, technological change, e.g. an increase in labour 
productivity, will reduce the wage share if wages do not keep up with productivity. This 
stands in stark contrast to the neoclassical framework where the effects of changes in 
productivity will depend on the elasticity of substitution. Several contributions have 
examined how changes in labour productivity are endogenous with respect to the wage share 
or the real wage (Cassetti, 2003; Bhaduri, 2006; Storm & Naastepad, 2012; Hein, 2014). 
Finally, in so far as technological change facilitates replacement of workers by machines, this 
increases the credibility of the firing threat and thereby reduces labour’s bargaining power. 
Therefore, the Political Economy approach also considers a social effect of technological 
change (Marglin, 1974), but does not necessarily imply a skill bias. 
                                                 
4 In the following, we refer to the Marxist, Institutionalist and post-Keynesian/Kaleckian analysis as the Political 
Economy approach because we believe that the core hypotheses of these different schools of thought can be 
reconciled in the framework presented below. 
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The effect of globalisation on the wage share is often analysed in the context of fall-
back options of capital and labour in the Political Economy literature. In addition to the 
negative effect of trade liberalisation that was discussed above, recent contributions consider 
the effect of capital mobility. The deregulation of financial flows has increased the fall-back 
options of capital which can now be invested in real as well as financial assets internationally 
(Jayadev, 2007; Stockhammer, 2016).5 
 Consequently, although the New Keynesian and the Political Economy approach to 
income distribution start from different assumptions, both arrive at a bargaining framework to 
analyse the distribution of income. Then what is the difference? Theoretically, the assumption 
of marginalist pricing in the face of imperfect competition on the product market requires that 
the price elasticity of demand is larger than one (otherwise marginal revenue would be 
negative and could never equal marginal costs). However, empirical estimates of price 
elasticities indicate a value much below one (Blinder, et al., 1999). Another difference is that 
in the Political Economy approach factors such as globalisation cannot be neatly 
distinguished into their effect on relative prices on the one hand, and bargaining power on the 
other hand. For example, offshoring could decrease the wage share through an increase in the 
firing threat that disciplines workers, or because segments of production with a relatively 
higher wage share are outsourced abroad. While this can appear as a caveat, the Political 
Economy framework allows to explain the negative effect of globalisation, the capital-output 
ratio or technological change on the wage share without relying on a certain value of the 
elasticity of substitution, or the assumption of optimising firms with full knowledge of their 
continuous and differentiable production and demand functions.6 
 
 
Several empirical papers have confirmed an impact of direct measures of bargaining power, 
such as strike activity, collective bargaining arrangements and minimum wages on the wage 
                                                 
5 There are other trends that form part of the phenomenon of financialisation and can negatively affect the wage 
share, such as increasing household debt or financial payments of non-financial corporations. However, most 
variables are not available at the sector level and are therefore excluded from the discussion. We found them 
insignificant in our empirical analysis (results available upon request). See Kohler, Guschanski and 
Stockhammer (2017) for a detailed analysis of the effect of financialisation on the wage share using aggregate 
country data. 
6 Recent papers based on firm level data emphasise that the decline of the wage share is driven by a small 
number of superstar firms (Autor, et al. 2017). Consequently, increased concentration allowed successful firms 
to reduce their wage share, while the wage share stagnated in the majority of companies. While testing this 
hypothesis requires the use of firm level data, we can nevertheless account for the factors that enabled superstar 
firms to reduce the wage share, insofar as they are not particularly related to their size (e.g. network effects or 
increasing returns to scale).  
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share (Kristal, 2010; Argitis & Pitelis, 2001; Bentolila & Saint-Paul, 2003; EC, 2007; ILO, 
2011). Union density is the most commonly used variable with the best data availability and 
the most robust positive effect on the wage share in country level estimations (Stockhammer, 
2009; Stockhammer, 2016; ILO, 2011). Nevertheless, the actual effect of unions may be 
underestimated in empirical studies since collective bargaining coverage greatly exceeds 
union membership in some countries (Visser, 2006). Conversely, Jaumotte and Buitron 
(2015) have argued that high collective bargaining coverage relative to union density, as in 
Spain and France, can increase unemployment when wage demands of unions become 
excessive. However, while evidence for a significant negative effect of union strength on 
unemployment is weak (OECD, 2006), in analyses of the wage share such a mechanism 
should be reflected in the capital-output ratio. IMF (2007; 2017), and EC (2007) find no 
significant effect of union density in most specifications. Welfare state retrenchment is found 
to be an important determinant of the fall in the wage share (Harrison, 2002; Jayadev, 2007; 
Onaran, 2009; Stockhammer, 2016). However, the measure used is often aggregate 
government spending, which does not reflect changes in government composition. Kristal 
(2010) uses government civilian spending, which nevertheless does not capture the details of 
spending that is particularly important for the social wage and bargaining power of labour 
such as in-kind benefits and cash transfers.  
Lastly, there is some empirical research on the effects of changes in the wage share on 
personal inequality (Daudey & Garcia-Penalosa, 2007; Wolff & Zacharias, 2013) but not on 
the effects of the latter on the wage share. The increase in personal inequality affects the 
command over resources and power relations (Stiglitz, 2012). Increasing economic and 
political power in the hands of a small elite allows them what Stiglitz (2012) calls ‘regulatory 
capture’ – i.e. to limit redistribution as well as to shape the rules in areas ranging from 
corporate governance to product and labour market regulation in their interest. Consequently, 
we would expect a negative effect of personal distribution on the wage share. 
Previous research controls for the effect of technological change by the inclusion of 
the capital-output ratio (or, equivalently, the capital-labour ratio, or relative prices of capital 
and labour) – capturing the effect of a decline in the relative price of capital – and a measure 
of capital-augmenting technological change. The two proxies used for capital augmenting 
technological change are the ICT capital stock and total factor productivity (TFP). Both come 
with their caveats: ICT capital is part of the general capital stock and therefore captures 
substitution processes that are not necessarily driven by technological change. TFP is a 
generic measure that is derived as a residual of a production function model where factors are 
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remunerated according to their marginal product (Timmer, et al., 2007). This seems 
tautological in a study whose aim is to analyse the determinants of the labour share. Finally, 
TFP will be biased to the extent that it captures labour- as well as capital augmenting 
technological change (Bassanini & Manfredi, 2012). 
While previous neoclassical/new Keynesian research on OECD countries emphasises 
technological change as the major explanatory variable for the decline in the wage share, the 
lack of robustness of the effect appears to be ignored in the evaluation of the results. 
Theoretically, a negative effect of technological change requires an elasticity of substitution 
larger than one, which should be reflected in a negative effect of capital intensity and TFP on 
the wage share. IMF (2007) finds a U-shaped relationship between the ICT intensity and the 
wage share and no robust effect of the capital-labour ratio, while in EC (2007) ICT capital is 
statistically insignificant in estimations for the total labour share. Furthermore, Stockhammer 
(2016) argues that a close examination of the reported findings reveals serious robustness 
issues regarding the effects of technology. Harrison (2002) finds an elasticity of substitution 
smaller than one. Doan and Wan (2017) find contradicting results for advanced economies: 
an elasticity of substitution larger than one based on TFP and an elasticity smaller than one 
based on the capital-labour ratio. Stockhammer (2009; 2016) does not find a statistically 
significant coefficient for ICT or the capital-labour ratio that would be robust across different 
specifications.  
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) and Bassanini and Manfredi (2012), are closer to our 
own approach in that their analysis is based on sectoral data and controls for potential 
endogeneity between technological change and the wage share. They obtain significant 
negative effects of the capital-output ratio as well as TFP, implying an elasticity of 
substitution larger than one. Hutchinson and Persyn (2012) confirm the finding with respect 
to technology but they do not account for endogeneity. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) 
consistently obtain an elasticity of substitution larger than one. IMF (2017) fail to find a 
significant effect of the relative price of investment on the wage share for tradable sectors, 
while there is some evidence for a negative effect in non-tradable sectors with a high initial 
exposure to routinisation. Elsby, et al. (2013) find no statically significant effect of the 
relative price of capital on the wage share. 
As summarised in Table 1, out of the 13 studies surveyed above, seven found an 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour that is smaller or equal to one, implying 
no significant negative effect of technological change on the wage share.  
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<Table 1> 
 
Articles presenting the most robust evidence for an elasticity of substitution larger than one 
use sector level data and follow the model proposed by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), i.e. 
Hutchinson and Persyn (2012) and Bassanini and Manfredi (2012). This model is derived 
from a constant elasticity of substitution production function.7 We argue that the robustness 
of their results might be driven by the fact that the specification is similar to an accounting 
identity. Indeed, Felipe and McCombie (2013) have argued that estimations of production 
functions run the danger of being simple reproductions of accounting identities. To see how 
this can be applied to models of the wage share (𝑊𝑆), we consider its definition 𝑊𝑆 =
 1 –  𝑟. (
𝐾
𝑌
), where (𝑟) is the profit rate, (𝐾) is capital stock and (𝑌) is output, and take the 
total derivative with respect to time: 
 
𝑊𝑆̇  = −(1 − 𝑊𝑆).
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
ln(𝑟) − (1 − 𝑊𝑆). [
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
ln(𝐾) −
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
ln(𝑌)] (1) 
 
The estimation equation used by Bassanini and Manfredi (2012),7 is a discrete time 
approximation of equation (1), the only difference being that capital-augmenting 
technological change is replaced by the profit rate. However, the proxy for capital 
augmenting technological change is TFP, which is itself derived from a production function 
approach. Indeed, TFP growth can equally be expressed as a weighted average of changes in 
wages and profits (Felipe & McCombie, 2013). Consequently, TFP should be strongly 
correlated with the profit rate, which increases the similarity of Bassanini and Manfredi’s 
(2012) estimation equation to an accounting identity. Similar considerations apply to the 
measurement of capital. Capital stock is measured either as an aggregation of depreciated 
investments on an initial capital stock value or within a user cost approach. In the EU 
KLEMS database the former is referred to as capital stock, while the latter is capital services. 
Most authors prefer to use capital services in their analysis (EC, 2007; Bassanini & Manfredi, 
2012). However, the user costs approach is ‘[…] based on the assumption that marginal costs 
                                                 
7 For example, the baseline specification of Bassanini and Manfredi (2012) takes the following form: 
∆𝑊𝑆𝑡 = 𝜃. ∆ln(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡) + 𝜃. ∆ln (
𝐾
𝑌
)
𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑡  
where t is the time index, TFP is total factor productivity, (
𝐾
𝑌
) is the capital to value added ratio and 𝜀 is the 
error term. 
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reflect marginal productivity’ (Koszerek, et al., 2007). Consequently, the robust findings of 
papers using such a specification may partly be driven by an accounting identity.  
Research based on both mainstream and Political Economy approaches find 
substantial negative effects of globalisation on the wage share, measured by trade openness 
(imports plus exports as a ratio to GDP), foreign direct investment (FDI) or offshoring, in line 
with the hypothesis that trade liberalisation increases the fall-back options of capital 
(Harrison, 2002; EC, 2007; IMF, 2007; Jayadev, 2007; Dünhaupt, 2016; Stockhammer, 
2016). Research using sector level data finds negative effects of offshoring in high wage 
countries, while there are mixed results for FDI (Onaran, 2011; Onaran, 2012; Bassanini & 
Manfredi, 2012; Lin & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013). IMF (2017) employ trade intensity as well 
as forward and backward trade linkages, a measure related to offshoring, and confirm a 
negative impact on the wage share in sectors producing tradable goods. IMF (2017) does not 
find a significant effect of financial globalisation in the sector level estimations, although 
there is evidence for a negative effect in their country-level estimations for advanced 
economies, while the effect turns positive for emerging markets. Interestingly, IMF (2007), 
EC (2007) and Bassanini and Manfredi (2012) interpret their findings as consistent with the 
traditional trade theory. However, as discussed above, it is hard to reconcile this 
interpretation with the assumption of optimising firms and the fact that the capital-output 
ratio and capital augmenting technological change is controlled for in their models. The 
findings in the Political Economy literature (Jayadev, 2007; Harrison, 2002; Onaran, 2009; 
Stockhammer, 2016) indicate that globalisation has a negative effect on the wage share in the 
developing as well as developed countries which is in-line with an interpretation based on 
bargaining power. 
Empirically, the majority of studies use aggregate country level panel data, which 
does not allow to differentiate the results across skill groups and industries. Within the 
mainstream literature, which holds technological change as the main factor explaining falling 
wage shares, Bassanini and Manfredi (2012), Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and the IMF 
(2017) use sectoral as well as country panel data; however they barely control for variables 
which would reflect the bargaining power of labour and labour market institutions, welfare 
state retrenchment or financialisation. Furthermore, they do not distinguish their offshoring 
measure by country of origin. Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013), Onaran (2011; 2012) and 
Guschanski and Onaran (2016) are closest to our analysis, but while these studies focus on 
single countries, we perform our analysis for a panel of selected OECD countries and are 
therefore able to account for issues related to endogeneity.  
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3. Empirical model and methodology 
Our aim is to decompose the effect of different determinants of the wage share; therefore, we 
seek a generic model that is compatible with different theoretical approaches to income 
distribution. Our baseline specification combines explanatory variables originating from the 
neoclassical model discussed in Section 2, but is adapted to allow for effects of institutional 
factors determining bargaining power and globalisation:  
 
𝑊𝑆𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑊𝑆𝑊𝑆𝑐,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑇ln (𝑇𝐹𝑃)𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝐾𝐼ln (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌)𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛼𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔𝐵𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑐,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑆𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑐,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑖,𝑡  (2)
  
where WS is the adjusted wage share in sector i of country c, which is measured as labour 
compensation as a ratio to value added adjusted for the labour income of the self-employed, 
imputed based on the assumption that their hourly labour income is equal to the average 
hourly labour income of the sector.8 Furthermore, we estimate separate specifications for the 
share of the labour compensation in sectoral value added for high-, medium- and low-skilled 
workers defined by their level of education.9   
TFP denotes the logarithm of total factor productivity and is used as a proxy for 
capital augmenting technological change (Bentolila & Saint-Paul, 2003; Bassanini & 
Manfredi, 2012). Consequently, we expect a negative effect on the wage share if the elasticity 
of substitution between capital and labour is larger than one.  
CAPITAL INTENSITY, our main measure of the extent to which labour is substituted 
by capital, is composed of two variables measured as the logarithm of ICT and non-ICT 
                                                 
8 Where data from EU KLEMS is not available or where the wage share is constant for several years in a row 
(indicating lack of data in the national accounts) we extrapolate through splicing. More specifically, we link the 
wage share from KLEMS with the growth rate of the wage share obtained from the World Input-Output 
Database (WIOD) and the OECD Structural Analysis database (OECD STAN). Since self-employed are not 
included in the measure of labour compensation in OECD STAN we impute their wages by applying the same 
technique as in EU KLEMS. We exclude observations where the number of self-employed suddenly falls to 
zero, assuming that it must be related to a measurement problem. The three series have correlations of 0.91 and 
above. We exclude outliers in the wage share by excluding cases where the percentage change in the wage share 
exceeds 30% in one year. These outliers mostly appear in the UK and Sweden. However, our results are largely 
robust to the inclusion of outliers.  
9 Low, medium and high skilled refers to workers with primary, secondary and tertiary education, respectively. 
Their respective wage shares add up to the sectoral wage share. See Table A2 in the appendix for more details 
on the skill classification. 
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capital services as a ratio to value added in our baseline specification.10 Again, we expect a 
negative effect on the wage share if capital is a gross substitute for labour. 
Furthermore, we include GROWTH, measured as the logarithmic change in value 
added, to account for the counter-cyclicality of the wage share (Kalecki, 1954).  
We capture the effect of GLOBALISATION by narrow offshoring, measured as intra-
industry intermediate imports, based on the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), in our 
baseline specification. Additionally, we differentiate intermediate imports by origin from 
three country groups defined as ‘high-wage’ countries (countries as in our panel plus Canada 
and Denmark)11, ‘Eastern Europe’ (EU10 and Russia), and ‘rest of the world’ (RoW). In 
alternative specifications discussed below, we also estimate the impact of inward and 
outward FDI and migration. 
𝐵𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺 is a vector of variables related to industrial relations and labour 
market institutions including union density at the sector level, country-level minimum wages 
as a ratio to sectoral average labour compensation per employee, and social government 
spending at the country level. Data for union density is based on Visser (2015) and only 
available at an aggregated level of sectoral classification and not available for each year. 
Therefore, we linearly interpolate the series between available years and extrapolate using the 
growth rate of data available for the next higher level of aggregation. For example, we 
extrapolate data for individual manufacturing sectors using the growth rate of the total 
manufacturing union density or country-level union density when the latter series was not 
available. Nevertheless, we think our indicative results are important as this paper is the first 
attempt to analyse the impact of union density on sectoral wage share for a large group of 
countries. Theoretically, an increase in any of the bargaining measures is expected to have a 
positive impact on the wage share, given that potential negative effects of an increase in 
wages on employment should be captured by the capital-output ratio. We also include the 
female share in hours of employment at the sectoral level, which is expected to have a 
negative impact on the wage share given the persistence of gender wage gaps, which may 
reflect lower collective voice of women. Notwithstanding the issues associated with this 
model as discussed in Section 2, we chose equation (2) as our baseline specification because 
                                                 
10 Despite theoretical issues raised in section 2, capital ‘services’ are available for more countries than the 
capital ‘stock’ measure and the use of this variable makes our analysis directly comparable to other papers. 
However, we provide robustness test with capital stock measured as ‘stock’. 
11 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK, the US. 
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it facilitates comparability of our analysis with previous studies. Variable definitions and data 
sources are listed in table A7 in the appendix.  
Next we discuss our estimation methodology. Given that technological change is 
likely to be a function of past or current values of the wage share, we have to take potential 
endogeneity into account (Acemoglu, 2003; Cassetti, 2003; Bhaduri, 2006; Hein, 2014). 
Similarly, workplaces where workers have higher bargaining power, as reflected in a higher 
wage share, might effectively resist offshoring, thereby leading to a negative effect of a 
higher wage share on offshoring (Barthelemy & Geyer, 2001). The bias arising when 
ignoring this endogeneity in estimations using the within estimator will be opposite to the 
direction of the reverse causality (Wooldridge, 2002). We argue that this might be the reason 
for the finding of high and significant negative effects of technological change on the wage 
share in previous papers, which do not properly account for endogeneity, e.g. EC (2007) and 
IMF (2007; 2017). The effect of globalisation might be understated for the same reason. 
Accounting for simultaneity and reverse causality in a dynamic model requires the use of 
instrumental variables. We use the General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator introduced 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) because it provides readily available ‘internal’ instruments 
based on lagged values of the explanatory variables.12  
To arrive at our baseline specification we adopt an estimation strategy that starts with 
the most general specification and the most robust estimator (one-step difference GMM) and 
work our way toward the most parsimonious model with the most efficient estimator (two-
step difference GMM with standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and Windmeijer 
(2005) small sample error correction), following Kiviet, et al. (2015). We start with the 
estimation of a fairly unrestricted Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model including 
the contemporaneous and lagged value of all explanatory variables and the first and second 
lag of the dependent variable. All estimations include year dummies to account for 
unobserved shocks and mitigate cross-sectional dependence. We treat all variables as 
endogenous. Subsequently, we perform a ‘testing down’ procedure by dropping variables 
with the lowest t-statistic, until we are left with at least one measure per variable. Thereafter, 
we test whether some of our variables can be treated as predetermined or exogenous by 
                                                 
12 As any other estimator, the GMM estimator is based on the assumption that we have no omitted time-varying 
variable that is correlated with the wage share and any of our covariates. For this reason, it is important to 
account for a lagged dependent variable as well as to start the estimations based on a fairly general model that 
allows for several lags of the explanatory variables. Additionally, given that we cannot account for all possible 
determinants of bargaining power at the same time, the use of the GMM estimator mitigates potential 
endogeneity of our explanatory variable as long as the correlation between these omitted factors and our 
explanatory variables is only contemporaneous. 
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including one-by-one more recent lags of the variable as an additional instrument and testing 
for its validity by applying the incremental Sargan test. This procedure indicates exogeneity 
of union density, while the other variables are treated as endogenous. Thereafter, we reduce 
the number of instruments to see whether our results change. This results in four instruments 
per variable for estimations going back to the 1970s and three instruments per variable 
otherwise (starting from the second lag for the endogenous variables). Only then do we move 
to the two-step approach to estimate the weighting matrix for the instruments used in our 
model.13 Furthermore, we provide estimations using the within-estimator for selected 
specifications for comparison.  
4. Data and stylised facts 
We compile a comprehensive database for 14 high-wage OECD economies drawing on seven 
publicly available international databases for sectoral data which we augment by country 
level data. Due to the impact of the Great Recession on industrial relations and wage 
determination as well as a break in the dataset, we estimate our specifications for two 
separate time periods of 1970 – 2007 and 2008 – 2014.14 For example, unions might be 
focused on maintaining employment during a recession and even coordinate wage cuts. 
Furthermore, TFP usually shows massive declines in a recession which have little to do with 
‘negative technology shocks’ but are simply an effect of the lack of aggregate demand. 
Estimation period for specifications with offshoring start in 1995 due to data availability.  
While the observed decline in the aggregate country-level labour share is a well-
documented fact, there is only limited analysis at the sectoral level. We find that the trend 
observed in the aggregate country level wage share is mirrored at the sectoral level, albeit 
                                                 
13 Lastly, we include additional moment conditions that can be applied to the model estimated in level instead of 
differences. Most studies that apply the system GMM estimator do not report the value of the Incremental 
Sargan test for the estimations in level, claiming the validity of the instruments based on the value of the overall 
Hansen test. This seems unfortunate, given the strong assumption (referred to as the stationarity condition) 
underlying the validity for the instruments in level. 
14 While previous releases of the EU KLEMS database could be made compatible by the use of concordance 
tables, this is not possible with the December 2016 release due to changes in variable definitions. The data split 
also allows us to use our variables at the most disaggregated industry level. We exclude the following sectors 
from the estimations: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing, Mining and Quarrying and Coke and Refined 
Petroleum sectors as well as mostly publicly owned sectors (Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory 
Social Security; Education; Human Health and Social Work Activities). This is because the wage setting 
behaviour in these industries may not be determined by the same forces as other sectors. For example, publicly 
owned not-for-profit companies will typically have a wage share of 100%, while value added in Agriculture and 
Mining will fluctuate enormously with changes in commodity prices. Furthermore, we exclude the real estate 
sector whose value added largely constitutes imputed rents (Timmer, et al., 2007).  Table A1 in the appendix 
contains a detailed sector overview.  
14 
 
with differences between manufacturing and services sectors as well as high (HS) and low 
skilled (LS) sector groups as can be seen in Figure 1 below for selected countries.  
 
<Figure 1> 
 
The wage share in France exhibits a strong skill bias. However, although there is a 
clear decline in the wage share of low skilled service and manufacturing sectors, high skilled 
services have lost out in comparison to their own position in the 1980s as well. In fact, the 
only sector group characterised by a slightly increasing wage share is high skilled 
manufacturing.  
In Germany, the wage share appears to be quite stable until the early 2000s, which 
marks the implementation of the Hartz reforms – one of the most drastic labour market policy 
packages to be implemented in Germany. Thereafter all sector groups except high skilled 
services exhibit a strong decline in the wage share. The wage share in the high skilled 
manufacturing industries declined by more than 19 percentage-points between 1993 and 
2008, the strongest reduction in all sector groups.  
The UK presents a diverse picture. While low skilled services experienced a steady 
reduction in the wage share since the mid-1990s until 2007, low skilled manufacturing 
sectors have increased their wage share in the same period, although they still lost out 
compared to the early 1980s. In the high skilled sectors the wage share appears to be highly 
volatile, but the wage share in high-skilled service sectors in 2014 is still 6 percentage-points 
lower than its value of 74 percent in the mid-1980s, and the wage share in high skilled 
manufacturing in 2014 is 10 percentage-points lower than its peak in 1981 at 72 percent.  
The USA and Sweden experienced a steady decline in high and low skilled 
manufacturing as well as low skilled service wage shares, while high skilled service wage 
shares appear to be relatively stable – a sector dominated by high wages in the financial 
sector.  
In Italy, all sector groups experienced a steady decline since the early 1980s, a trend 
which has been slightly reversed in the early 2000s. Nevertheless, the aggregate wage share 
has stagnated, pointing towards a decline of the wage share in public sectors.  
In Spain wage shares follow a U-shaped pattern until the mid-1990s, after which the 
manufacturing sectors start declining, while high-skilled services remain constant until the 
Great Recession. One exception is low skilled service industries which experienced a decline 
through the whole period by 26 percentage-points between 1970 and 2010.  
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Summing up, despite the diversity of wage share dynamics across countries and 
sectors, there are only very few sectors which seem to be exempt from the declining trend. 74 
percent of all sectors experienced a decline in the wage share between 1980 and 2007, and 
64percent experienced a decline that is larger than 3%-points. The wage share declined most 
strongly and consistently across countries in service sectors like Post and 
Telecommunications, Electricity, Gas and Water Supply, and Retail Trade, as well as 
manufacturing sectors like Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal and Paper, Printing and 
Publishing. Most of these sectors (except Retail Trade and Basic Metals) are classified as 
high-skilled, the opposite from what we would expect according to the hypothesis of skill-
biased technological change. Furthermore, Post and Telecommunications as well as Utilities 
experienced large-scale privatisations in many countries (Bassanini & Manfredi, 2012). This 
confirms previous findings that attribute the decline of the country-level wage share to a 
decline of the wage share within sectors (IMF, 2017; Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2014). 
When looking at the wage share of high-, medium- and low-skilled workers (as 
defined by their level of education) in value added of the sector, we can see a stronger skill 
bias.  
 
<Figure 2> 
 
The share of high skilled workers’ wage bill in total value added increased in some countries; 
however, the picture is dominated by declining wage shares of both medium and low skilled 
workers. Importantly, a decline in the wage ratio of workers as defined by their level of 
education captures losing out with respect to capital, workers of another skill group, as well 
as a change in the educational composition of the workforce. Therefore, we control for 
changes in the supply of skilled workers in our empirical analysis. Additionally, given that 
our data for this series is limited to the period between 1995 and 2009, we are unable to 
compare with the pre-1980s. Nevertheless, using this data to distinguish different effects 
across skill-groups in addition to estimations for sector groups is imperative, because data by 
skill group does not require the restrictive assumption that the wage share in the low-skilled 
sectors reflects predominantly the share of low-skilled workers in those sectors.   
Variables accounting for globalisation show similar patterns across all countries. 
Offshoring increased in all countries in both high and low skilled manufacturing sectors. 
While offshoring to Eastern Europe and the rest of the world increased most significantly, the 
majority of offshoring is still among the ‘high-wage’ countries. The years of the Great 
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Recession and shortly afterwards are the only exception to the otherwise increasing trend, 
which resumed in 2010 in all countries. The highest growth rates were experienced in the 
1990s in Sweden and Germany, driven by high skilled manufacturing sectors which generally 
have a higher share of intermediate imports than low skilled manufacturing sectors.   
 
<Figure 3 > 
 
We observe a steady increase in the share of ICT capital across all sectors and 
countries. Union density declined in all sector groups in France, Germany, the UK, the USA 
and Austria, while the decline is more moderate, albeit still visible, in Italy and Sweden. 
Union density followed an inverted U-shape pattern in Spain between 1980 and 2010, 
however not exceeding the comparatively low level of 20 percent at the aggregate level. In 
most countries union density began to decrease in the 1980s, with the exception of Austria, 
France and the USA where it has been declining since the 1970s. Union density is highest in 
manufacturing sectors and lowest in low skilled service sectors. However, the latter group is 
also characterised by the smallest reduction in union density. Union density measured at the 
country level declined most strongly in Austria where we observe a reduction by 34 
percentage-points between 1970 and 2014, followed by the UK and Germany where the 
reduction constitutes 24 and 20 percentage-points respectively.  
 
5. Estimation Results 
Table 2 reports estimation results for our baseline model (equation 2) and several robustness 
tests.15 Specification (1) in Table 2 is estimated for the time period 1973-2007,16 excluding 
offshoring. All variables have the expected signs. We can test our hypothesis that this 
specification runs the danger of capturing an accounting identity, as would be suggested by 
equation (1), by comparing the coefficient in front of TFP and capital intensity with the 
average profit share in our sample. At the same time, we must keep in mind that we are 
instrumenting the variables with their past values, which might reduce the similarity of our 
                                                 
15 We have also estimated a specification with only TFP and capital intensity, thereby effectively reproducing 
results from Bassanini and Manfredi (2012) for the period from 1970 to 2007. The long-run coefficients of TFP 
and ICT capital intensity have the expected values and are significant, while non-ICT capital is statistically 
insignificant. However, there are potential issues with the validity of instruments in this specification, as 
suggested by low values of the Hansen test.  
16 Estimations start in 1973 (1997) rather than 1970 (1995) due to the inclusion of lagged values and the 
necessity to use instruments.   
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estimation to an accounting identity. Indeed, reducing the number of instruments step-by-step 
(and thereby approaching the accounting identity) appears to reduce the coefficients for non-
ICT capital and TFP until they approach a value around 0.3 which is very similar to the 
average profit share of 0.31 in the sample.    
 
<Table 2> 
 
Given that several of our variables of interest, specifically offshoring, are available only from 
1995 onwards, we split our sample, estimating two separate regressions for the periods 1973-
1996 and 1997-2007. Our results in specification (2) for the period 1997-1996 are robust 
compared to specification (1). However, results for the period 1997-2007 in specification (3) 
paint a very different picture: all variables turn insignificant, with the exception of growth.17 
Including aggregate offshoring in specification (4) does not change much, and offshoring 
itself is statistically insignificant. However, this result conceals the different impact of 
offshoring by origin as can be seen in specification (5). Offshoring to emerging markets, 
growth and union density are statistically significant with the expected sign.  
After 1997 variables accounting for technological change appear to have only minor 
relevance as indicated by the statistical insignificance of the coefficients; in contrast union 
density remains statistically significant. There are several potential reasons that might explain 
this lack of robustness. From a neoclassical perspective, the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labour might change due to automatization of routine tasks or an increasing level 
of education among the workforce, pushing the two factors of production more in the 
direction of complements than substitutes. Another reason might be an increase in 
uncertainty, which hinders firms to accurately maximise their profits. From a political 
economy perspective, financialisation, through its impact on firms’ objectives, might have 
decoupled wage negotiations and employment decisions from real production processes and 
made them more dependent on share price performance. Most certainly, as indicated by the 
high significance of offshoring, globalisation, demand conditions abroad and foreign 
competition have played a strong role. We find a negative coefficient of offshoring to the rest 
of the world, which mainly consist of emerging and developing countries. Given that 
negative effects of globalisation resulting from changes in factor demand should be captured 
                                                 
17 Excluding growth and union density and performing a general to specific approach shows insignificant 
coefficients for all but the lagged dependent variable and a worrisome low value of the Hansen test (see Table 
A3, specification (3) in the appendix). 
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by the capital-output ratio, this result is in line with our predictions based on the impact of 
globalisation on bargaining power. Finally, union density appears to have a robust positive 
impact on the wage share.  
Next, we extend our analysis to the post-2007 period in specifications (6-7). 
Interestingly, while growth stays significant with the expected sign, we cannot confirm a 
robust effect of any of the other variables. Indeed, only non-ICT capital intensity appears to 
be significant and robust in specification (7), and offshoring to high wage countries has a 
significant and positive effect, which is different from the pre-crisis period. Allowing for 
different lag structures of the variables or including interaction terms yields similar results 
with growth, and less often, non-ICT capital, being the only significant variables. 
Furthermore, union density is not statistically significant anymore. This provides clear 
indication for the hypothesis that the Great Recession strongly disturbed underlying 
economic relationships.  
Table (3) reports estimations by different sector- and skill groups as well as further 
robustness tests.  
 
<Table 3> 
 
Specifications (1-3) in Table 3 report our baseline for high-, medium- and low-skilled 
workers’ labour compensation in sectoral value added. We also include the share of the 
labour force that has attained the level of education defined by the skill group as an 
explanatory variable in order to account for shifts in labour supply. The results regarding the 
effects of technological change are in contrast to the expectations from a neoclassical 
perspective. First, we find statistically significant negative effects of TFP and capital intensity 
only for medium skilled workers. Interestingly, estimations for manufacturing and service 
sectors separately (specifications 4 and 7 in Table 3), reveal that these results are mainly 
driven by service sectors, especially those classified as high-skilled (specification 11, Table 
A4 in the appendix), although there is also evidence for an effect in low-skilled 
manufacturing sectors (specification 4, Table A4). While the impact in service sectors might 
seem surprising at a first glance, some of these sectors had a high potential for automatization 
in the mid-1990s (IMF, 2017). Low-skilled workers, supposedly those with the highest 
substitutability by capital, are least affected by TFP, which, while being insignificant, even 
has a positive sign in specification 3 (in Table 3). This result is confirmed in estimations for 
service sectors classified as high-skilled and manufacturing sectors classified as low-skilled 
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(see specification (5) and (12) in Table A4 in the appendix). It is indeed medium-skilled 
workers in high-skilled service sectors that drive the negative impact of TFP on the wage 
share (see Table A4 specification 8 and 11).  
While the negative impact of technological change on medium skilled workers can be 
explained by the process of automatization of routine tasks, the lack of a significant effect on 
low-skilled workers is puzzling. These results are less surprising from a Political Economy 
perspective, where substitutability is assumed to be small and distribution largely depends on 
bargaining power. Our findings suggest that medium-skilled workers, whose labour 
productivity might have increased even faster than those of low-skilled workers, have not 
benefitted as much as capital from the technological advancements. Furthermore, if we do not 
control for endogeneity there is some evidence of a negative effect of TFP on the total wage 
share and of non-ICT capital on the low skilled workers (see specifications (1-2) in Table A3 
in the appendix, where the within-estimator instead of the GMM estimator is used. This bias 
resulting from reverse causality might be another explanation for the supposedly strong 
evidence for an effect of technological change, especially on low-skilled workers, obtained in 
previous studies (EC, 2007; IMF, 2007). 
While the negative effect of offshoring to the RoW is significant only for high-skilled 
workers, it is always negative, suggesting that offshoring harmed workers of all skill groups. 
While the effect on low-skilled workers is consistent with the assumption that segments 
employing low-skilled labour will suffer most strongly from offshoring practices, the 
coefficient is borderline insignificant. The negative effect on high-skilled workers is a novel 
finding. Furthermore, there appears to be a negative impact of offshoring to high-wage 
countries on high-skilled worker’s wage share combined with a positive effect of offshoring 
to Eastern Europe. We interpret this as the effect of Multinational Corporations that are 
increasingly operating in several of the high-wage countries simultaneously, thereby 
increasing their profits while not sharing with labour. Disaggregation by sector type reveals 
that the negative effect is mainly driven by manufacturing sectors, and by high- and low-
skilled workers alike, although the coefficient for low-skilled workers is statistically 
insignificant (Table A4 in the appendix). To shed further light on the effect of offshoring to 
Eastern Europe, which has been found to have a negative effect in previous research, we 
apply an interaction term for Austria, Germany, France and Finland, who have strong 
offshore ties with this region (Onaran, 2012). We confirm a negative impact of offshoring to 
Eastern Europe on the wage share in manufacturing sectors for these countries, which is 
driven by medium-skilled workers in specification (5-6), whereas the coefficient for other 
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countries is insignificant.18 We also added imports of final and capital goods as well as 
exports in the baseline specification, and estimated additional specifications with foreign 
direct investment (outward and inwards, based on the OECD STAN database) instead of 
offshoring as an alternative measure of globalisation, but we did not obtain any significant 
effects.   
The positive effect of union density appears to be driven by low skilled workers in 
manufacturing sectors (specification 3-5 in Table 3). Furthermore, it appears to have a 
negative impact on the wage share of high-skilled workers (specification 1, Table 3). This is 
consistent with the finding of Jaumotte and Buitron (2015), who find that union density 
reduces wage dispersion – for example by limiting excessive wages of managers. 
We estimate our long-sample baseline specification for the period of 1973-2007 with 
an alternative dependent variable, the wage share of the bottom 99% of the workers, which is 
obtained by subtracting the share of the wage income of the top 1% of the wage earners 
(specification 8, Table 3). Thereby, we seek to subtract the wage share of managers, whose 
income share is arguable not influenced by the same determinants as the rest of the workers. 
Since wage income of the top 1% is only available at the country level, we assume that an 
equal percentage share of each sectors’ wage share accrues to top income earners. The 
country pool includes only Australia, France, Italy, Spain, and the USA due to data 
availability  (Alvaredo, et al., 2015). We confirm the results of specification (1) Table 2 as 
can be seen in specification (8) Table 3.19  
Finally, we test the robustness of our results to the use of capital stock, rather than 
capital services in specification (9) Table 3. As mentioned previously we are concerned about 
the use of capital services in our model because of its measurement. The use of capital stock 
slightly reduces our sample due to data availability, so that we start in 1980 (rather than 
1970) and Belgium and Ireland are excluded. Results indicate that TFP, non-ICT capital, 
growth and union density are robust to the different measure of capital. However, ICT capital 
                                                 
18 We have also experimented with alternative specifications where offshoring to Southern European countries 
was, first, calculated as a separate category, and second, included into offshoring to Eastern Europe and the 
Russian Federation. However, this did not change the sign of offshoring to other high-wage OECD countries.  
19 To test whether the results of our baseline specification (specification 5, Table 2) are driven by insignificant 
variables, we continue with the general to specific procedure until only significant variables are left. The result 
is an estimation equation where only growth and union density are left, which confirms the robustness of our 
measure of direct bargaining power, while it casts some doubt on the robustness of offshoring. We also 
experimented with the system GMM estimator. We obtain a very low Hansen test which is driven by the 
instruments from the level equation, as can be deducted from the incremental Sargan test on this group of 
instruments. This speaks against the validity of the ‘stationarity assumption’ and thereby renders this estimation 
method unreliable. Put differently, it confirms our choice of difference GMM as the main estimation method. 
Results are reported in specification (8) and (9) of Table A3 in the appendix.  
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has a positive and significant coefficient in contradiction to the neoclassical hypothesis. This 
casts further doubt on the reliability of the explanatory power of technological change for the 
decline in the wage share. 
We proceed by testing the impact of additional factors that were discussed in Section 
2. Table 4 reports the results. 
 
<Table 4> 
 
Specification (1) in Table 4 applies an interaction term for union density (union density_int) 
which takes the value 1 for countries where wage bargaining takes place at the industry or 
national level: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Spain, and Sweden (i.e. excluding France, UK, USA and Australia; see Visser, 2015). The 
strong positive coefficient on the interacted variable suggest that high union density is more 
effective in increasing the wage share in countries with more coordinated bargaining regimes. 
Indeed, the effect for countries with mainly firm level bargaining is insignificant.  
Specification (2) in Table 4 includes the female share in employment as an additional 
explanatory variable for the period of 1970-2007. We find a negative effect on the wage 
share, which is driven by low-skilled workers in manufacturing industries. Estimations for the 
period of 1997-2007 are robust with respect to the effect of female share in employment but 
render offshoring insignificant. 20 
Specification (3) in Table 4 controls for the share of in-kind social government 
spending and cash transfers in total government spending. Applying interaction terms, we 
find that this measure is specifically important for countries with a relatively low level of 
collective bargaining coverage, classified as having an average collective bargaining 
coverage below 50%, such as Japan, Ireland, the UK and the US. While the effect is 
insignificant for other countries, this result should be seen as indicative given that the 
variable is measured at the country level. However, it suggests that in countries where 
successful wage negotiations are not shared with the wider labour force because of a low 
level of collective coverage, increasing the fall-back options of labour by increasing social 
government spending might be a viable strategy to raise the wage share. 
Specification (4) includes national minimum wages as a ratio to sectoral average 
wages for a pool of nine countries that had introduced minimum wages by 2007 (Australia, 
                                                 
20 Estimations for other skill-groups did not yield statistically significant results. Results are reported in Table 
A5 in the appendix. 
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Belgium, France, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the US). Evidence 
suggests a strong positive impact of higher minimum wages on the wage share. This result is 
also confirmed for the longer period of 1970- 2007. It is worth noting that minimum wages 
appear to be relevant for workers of all skill groups and across service and manufacturing 
sectors alike. Interestingly, union density turns insignificant, while still maintaining its 
positive coefficient.    
Specification (5) to (8) tests the effect of migration, defined as the share of foreign-
born employees in total labour force and measured at the country level, on the wage share. 
Theory suggests that the effect should be strongest for low-skilled workers who will suffer 
the most from wage competition by foreign employees. However, while the coefficient is 
negative, we obtain no statistically significant effect for either the total wage share or workers 
of different skill levels. This suggests that migration does not exercise a negative effect on the 
wage share, once globalisation and bargaining power is controlled for. Indeed, offshoring to 
low wage countries remains statistically significant with a negative sign in specification (5), 
indicating that capital mobility, rather than labour mobility has a negative impact on the wage 
share. Interestingly, offshoring to Eastern Europe appears to have a positive impact in this 
specification. However, the results should be taken as indicative, as the migration variable is 
not at the sector level. Further research using household labour force survey data is required 
for more conclusive evidence.   
Specification (9) controls for excess bargaining coverage, i.e. bargaining coverage as 
a ratio to union density at the sector level. We find a positive significant effect of this 
variable. The other variables, including union density, remain significant as well, suggesting 
an additional positive impact of bargaining coverage relative to union density on the wage 
share. This finding is in contrast to Jaumotte and Buitron (2015) as discussed above. 
However, excess bargaining coverage turns insignificant in the period 1973-2007 (see Table 
A5 in the appendix). Similarly, estimations with bargaining coverage alone (i.e. not as a ratio 
to union density) did not yield significant results, possibly because this variable is only 
available at the country level. 
Finally, specification (10) includes the Gini coefficient after taxes and transfers. The 
negative coefficient provides evidence to the hypothesis that personal income inequality, may 
lead to political capture and create an institutional environment conducive to policy changes 
at the expense of labour’s bargaining power and income. 
We have tested a set of other hypotheses outlined in Section 2 which are reported in 
Tables A5- A6 in the appendix. This include different measures of financialisation, such as 
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financial income and payments, and financial flows other than FDI flows. While we do 
confirm a negative effect of non-FDI flows on the wage share in specification (9) in Table 
A5, in line with Stockhammer (2016), the Hansen-test is not passed so this result can only be 
regarded as indicative. Other variables did not have a robust impact on the wage share in our 
specifications, which can be related to the fact that they are measured at the country level. We 
also did not find statistically significant effects of employment protection legislation, based 
on estimations with the Labour Regulation Index Dataset (Adams, et al., 2016), which 
provides data on labour laws using a novel ‘leximetric’ method (specification 1 in Table A6).   
Finally, we report the economic significance of our estimations based on specification 
(5) Table 2, by multiplying the average change (across all sectors included in the estimation) 
of our explanatory variables by their respective coefficients. We include statistically 
significant as well as insignificant variables, as we consider this calculation as an addition to 
the statistical hypothesis test. Results are presented in Table 5.  
 
<Table 5> 
 
Offshoring to emerging markets emerges as the single most important variable, accounting 
for 44% of the decline in the wage share between 1997 and 2007. However, given the 
positive impact of offshoring to Eastern Europe in this specification, the overall impact of 
offshoring in total is 26%.21 TFP had a considerable impact, accounting for up to 43% of the 
decline in the wage share, while union density accounts for 23%. Summing up, our results 
suggest that, if one is willing to accept TFP as an adequate measure of technological change, 
all three factors (technological change, globalisation and institutional changes) had a strong 
impact on the wage share. However, changes in bargaining power driven by union density 
and offshoring together had a larger impact on the wage share from 1997 to 2007 than 
technological change. 
6. Conclusion 
Our findings lend strong support to the Political Economy approach to functional income 
distribution. We confirm a significant negative effect of globalisation; the increase in fall-
back options of capital in the form of offshoring, rather than migration, is the most important 
driver of this process. Technological change, as measured by total factor productivity and 
                                                 
21 Nevertheless, we need to keep in mind that offshoring to Eastern Europe has proven to have a strong negative 
effect on continental European countries (specification 5, Table 3).  
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capital intensity, has a negative effect on medium skilled workers. While this finding is in 
line with the process of automatization of routine tasks, it cannot serve to explain the strong 
decline in low-skilled workers wage shares. Furthermore, our findings, as well as findings of 
existing studies with respect to technological change, might be overstated due to a strong 
similarity of our estimation equation to an accounting identity and the assumptions about 
income distribution that are inherent in the measure of TFP and capital services. Finally, the 
model applied in many mainstream studies shows clear issues of robustness across different 
time periods. Our finding should be interpreted as an indication that overly technical 
approaches to income distribution are too simplistic, and that institutional and social factors 
should be given more attention. Research in Political Economy has long emphasised that 
technology must be interpreted as a factor influencing bargaining positions rather than a 
mechanical process determining distribution outcomes. Our findings suggest that workers 
have not benefitted as much as capital from the technological advancements in the production 
process due to the decline in workers’ bargaining power. This decline is related to a strong 
deterioration in union density and minimum wages, welfare state retrenchment, and the 
overall rise in inequality according to our findings. The increase in female employment in the 
absence of strong collective representation of women and enforcement of equal pay 
legislation also contributes to the fall in the wage share. 
Other institutional factors and processes such as financialisation have received some 
attention in the recent literature on the wage share  (Stockhammer, 2016). Unfortunately, we 
were not able to obtain measures at a sectoral level, and country level measures of 
financialisation were not significant in explaining sectoral trends. However, firm level data 
might be a viable alternative and a promising direction for further research on the impact of 
financialisation.  
Our findings have important policy implications. Rising inequality is not an inevitable 
outcome of technological change. Tackling income inequality requires a restructuring of the 
institutional framework in which bargaining takes place and a level playing field where the 
bargaining power of labour is more in balance with that of capital. The impact of 
globalisation is likely to be significantly moderated and/or offset by stronger bargaining 
power of labour via an improvement in union legislation, increasing minimum wages, 
improving and enforcing equal pay legislation, increasing the social wage via public goods 
and social security and international labour standards embedded in a broader strategy of 
global cooperation for high road labour market policies and macroeconomic policy 
coordination. Furthermore, our results suggest that a simple attempt to reduce income 
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inequality through skill-upgrading will not work as medium-skilled workers have 
experienced the strongest negative impact of technological change among all workers, 
although low-skilled workers experienced the strongest decline in the wage share. 
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Figures and tables 
Figure 1: Wage share in selected countries, 1970-2014  
 
Source: Own calculations based on EU KLEMS. The line for the total wage share includes all sectors. Sector 
level lines exclude Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; and Mining and Quarrying; Coke and Refined 
Petroleum; Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security; Education; Human Health and 
Social Work Activities and Real Estate. HS and LS stands for high and low skilled sectors respectively.    
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Figure 2: Wage share by skill group as defined by workers’ education, 1995-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EU KLEMS and WIOD. 
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Figure 3: Total offshoring in selected OECD countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on WIOD. Figures exclude the following sectors: Agriculture, Hunting, 
Forestry and Fishing; and Mining and Quarrying; Coke and Refined Petroleum; Public Administration and 
Defence; Compulsory Social Security; Education; Human Health and Social Work Activities and Real Estate.   
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Table 1: Implied elasticity of substitution in selected papers 
Notes: HS, MS, LS indicate results for the wage share of high-, medium-, and low-skilled workers. If conflicting 
results are found the variables are indicated in in brackets. e=elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour; (K/L) = capital-output ratio; TFP = total factor productivity; ICT = ICT capital intensity 
  
Paper  Implied elasticity 
Country level 
Doan and Wan (2017) e<1 (K/L) 
e>1 (TFP) 
EC 2007 e<1 (K/L); e>1 (ICT) 
LS: e>1 
MS: e<1 
HS: e<1 
Elsby, et al. (2012) e=1 
Harrison (2002) e<1 
Hutchinson and Persyn (2012) e>1 
ILO (2011) e<1 
IMF (2007) e>1 (K/L) 
Non-linear for ICT 
Stockhammer 2009 e=1 
Stockhammer 2016 e<=1 
Sector level 
IMF (2017) e>=1  
Bassanini & Manfredi (2012) e>1 
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) e>1 
Karabarbounis & Neiman 2014 e>1 
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Table 2. Baseline specification and robustness of results over time 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
growth -0.205*** -0.222*** -0.331** -0.178 -0.267** -0.306*** -0.286*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.046) (0.119) (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) 
TFP -0.242*** -0.234*** -0.072 -0.055 -0.062 -0.070 -0.035 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.469) (0.218) (0.175) (0.393) (0.765) 
ICT -0.041*** -0.042**   -0.001 0.013 -0.009 
 (0.008) (0.018)   (0.883) (0.458) (0.788) 
ICT_(t-1) 0.021* 0.021* 0.007 0.001    
 (0.100) (0.099) (0.755) (0.843)    
nonICT -0.202*** -0.170*** -0.005 -0.049 -0.053 -0.099 -0.171* 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.965) (0.149) (0.120) (0.133) (0.061) 
offshoring_OECD_(t-1)     -0.364  1.179* 
     (0.404)  (0.051) 
offshoring East_(t-1)     1.811  1.409 
     (0.339)  (0.636) 
offshoring RoW_(t-1)     -1.725**  -1.267 
     (0.039)  (0.334) 
offshoring total_(t-1)    0.448    
    (0.408)    
union density_(t-1) 0.141*** 0.146*** 0.060 0.082** 0.084* -0.052 -0.201 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.162) (0.048) (0.063) (0.791) (0.210) 
wage share_(t-1) 0.640*** 0.703*** 0.646*** 0.709*** 0.747*** 0.476*** 0.580*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
wage share_(t-2) -0.057*** -0.072**      
 (0.007) (0.013)      
Hansen_pval 0.200 0.423 0.201 0.441 0.154 0.790 0.808 
AR1_pval 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2_pval 0.760 0.976 0.326 0.855 0.952 0.228 0.266 
Instruments 56 45 27 30 36 26 30 
Sectors 300 276 300 300 300 162 153 
F-test 33.882 34.565 16.296 11.763 12.196 23.253 17.114 
Observations 7835 4552 3837 3284 3284 1134 1071 
F-test year dummies 0.007 0.010 0.892 0.881 0.222 0.036 0.004 
Period 73-07 73-96 97-07 97-07 97-07 08-14 08-14 
Notes: The dependent variable is the sectoral adjusted wage share. Estimation method is ‘difference GMM’ 
(Arellano and Bond 1991) with Windmeijer small sample error correction and one instrument column per 
variable (collapse option). HS, MS and LS stands for high, medium and low skilled workers. P-values below the 
estimation coefficients in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Hansen_pval stands for the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions for all 
instruments. AR1 and AR2_pval is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of first and second 
order in the residuals. Instruments denote the number of instruments used. Sectors, F-test and Observations is 
the number of cross sections, the p-value of the F-test and the number of observations. F-test year dummies is 
the p-value of the Wald test on the joint significance of all year dummies. 
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Table 3: Robustness tests and sector disaggregation 
 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 
skill group HS MS LS All All MS All All  All  
sector type All All All MANU MANU MANU SERV All All 
growth -0.030 -0.088 -0.079 -0.322* -0.390** -0.285** -0.235* -0.210*** -0.173*** 
 (0.521) (0.173) (0.240) (0.076) (0.018) (0.041) (0.067) (0.004) (0.001) 
TFP 0.009 -0.068** 0.006 -0.072   -0.095* -0.251*** -0.241*** 
 (0.676) (0.033) (0.714) (0.248)   (0.066) (0.001) (0.000) 
TFP_(t-1)     -0.044 -0.021    
     (0.394) (0.582)    
ICT -0.001 -0.004 0.005 -0.072* -0.073**  0.000 -0.090*** 0.037*** 
 (0.802) (0.422) (0.213) (0.081) (0.047)  (0.996) (0.002) (0.000) 
ICT_(t-1)    0.057* 0.062** 0.001  0.061**  
    (0.076) (0.039) (0.883)  (0.013)  
nonICT 0.015 -0.047** -0.011 -0.086 -0.067 -0.011 -0.042 -0.110*** -0.261*** 
 (0.319) (0.023) (0.445) (0.121) (0.211) (0.746) (0.254) (0.001) (0.000) 
offshoring OECD_(t-1) -0.650** -0.458 0.242 0.143 0.616 0.410 -0.334   
 (0.024) (0.139) (0.482) (0.721) (0.177) (0.215) (0.876)   
offshoring East_(t-1) 2.004** -0.043 0.744 -4.175 -0.682 0.637 28.270   
 (0.023) (0.974) (0.467) (0.118) (0.841) (0.749) (0.237)   
offshoring East_int(t-1)     -5.443* -4.117**    
     (0.056) (0.030)    
offshoring RoW_(t-1) -1.330** -0.342 -0.833 -0.403 -0.405 0.769 -0.130   
 (0.019) (0.649) (0.162) (0.749) (0.745) (0.491) (0.925)   
union density_(t-1) -0.069*** 0.018 0.105*** 0.143* 0.133* 0.056 0.080  0.168*** 
 (0.002) (0.448) (0.000) (0.060) (0.086) (0.215) (0.241)  (0.008) 
union density        0.110*  
        (0.068)  
education_HS,MS,LS 0.094 -0.103*** -0.055***   -0.081    
 (0.234) (0.000) (0.005)   (0.112)    
wage share_(t-1) 0.526*** 0.762*** 0.676*** 0.506*** 0.488*** 0.519*** 0.671***  0.565*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
wage share_(t-2)   0.119***      -0.068*** 
   (0.000)      (0.000) 
wage share99_(t-1)        0.537***  
        (0.000)  
Hansen_pval 0.320 0.133 0.076 0.310 0.498 0.156 0.353 0.086 0.239 
AR1_pval 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
AR2_pval 0.868 0.948 0.319 0.384 0.411 0.563 0.676 0.204 0.848 
Instruments 37 37 36 36 39 40 36 42 46 
Sectors 300 300 295 166 166 166 134 107 246 
F-test 60.651 26.089 208.409 10.522 11.318 16.091 9.975 24.920 24.859 
Observations 3284 3284 293 1816 1816 1816 1468 2650 7213 
F-test year dummies 0.066 0.048 0.458 0.101 0.283 0.587 0.760 0.003 0.390 
Period 97-07 97-07 98-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 83-07 
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Notes: The dependent variable is the sectoral adjusted wage share, except for specification (8) where the wage share of the 99% is used. ‘wage share_(t-1)’ reflects the lagged 
dependent variable, i.e. the wage share of high-, medium-, low-skilled or all workers depending on the skill-group.  Estimation method is ‘difference GMM’ (Arellano and 
Bond 1991) with Windmeijer small sample error correction and one instrument column per variable (collapse option). HS, MS and LS stands for high, medium and low 
skilled workers. P-values below the estimation coefficients in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Hansen_pval 
stands for the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions for all instruments. AR1 and AR2_pval is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of 
first and second order in the residuals. Instruments denote the number of instruments used. Sectors, F-test and Observations is the number of cross sections, the p-value of the 
F-test and the number of observations. F-test year dummies is the p-value of the Wald test on the joint significance of all year dummies. 
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Table 4: Other explanatory factors for the wage share 
 1 Union 2 Gender 3 Gov’t 4 min wage 5 migration 6 migration 7 migration 8 migration 9 excess CB 10 Gini 
Skill-group All All All All All HS MS LS All All 
growth -0.242* -0.186*** -0.212 -0.287*** -0.264 -0.015 -0.099 -0.104* -0.372*** -0.346*** 
  (0.060) (0.000) (0.130) (0.000) (0.134) (0.771) (0.297) (0.098) (0.002) (0.003) 
TFP -0.064 -0.329*** -0.047 -0.034 -0.053 0.014 -0.078** -0.011 -0.035 -0.059 
  (0.159) (0.006) (0.318) (0.559) (0.254) (0.610) (0.039) (0.561) (0.401) (0.187) 
ICT -0.006 -0.028 -0.000 -0.007 -0.002 0.002 -0.014 0.008* -0.007 -0.002 
  (0.456) (0.378) (0.962) (0.532) (0.800) (0.738) (0.138) (0.073) (0.348) (0.727) 
ICT_(t-1)  0.005         
   (0.813)         
nonICT -0.045 -0.269*** -0.041 -0.045 -0.023 0.018 -0.047* -0.024 -0.013 -0.051 
  (0.186) (0.009) (0.239) (0.286) (0.518) (0.383) (0.084) (0.128) (0.677) (0.133) 
offshoring OECD_(t-1) -0.298  -0.425 0.093 -0.557 -0.824 -0.744 0.806** -0.426 -0.401 
  (0.501)  (0.349) (0.875) (0.584) (0.130) (0.370) (0.029) (0.458) (0.380) 
offshoring East_(t-1) 2.932  2.951 4.606 5.008** 0.600 2.834 -0.700 3.848** 0.348 
  (0.133)  (0.194) (0.109) (0.014) (0.721) (0.156) (0.351) (0.026) (0.871) 
offshoring RoW_(t-1) -1.882**  -2.391** -2.050* -2.943** -0.543 -1.990 0.286 -2.156*** -0.983 
  (0.030)  (0.032) (0.087) (0.038) (0.604) (0.117) (0.504) (0.010) (0.283) 
union density_(t-1) -0.049 0.134*** 0.058 0.057 0.083 -0.066* 0.070* 0.070 0.102** 0.087** 
  (0.504) (0.000) (0.221) (0.294) (0.205) (0.068) (0.083) (0.152) (0.028) (0.049) 
union density int_(t-1) 0.192**          
  (0.020)          
fem. share_(t-1)  -0.409*         
   (0.085)         
Govt expen_(t-1)   -0.089        
    (0.262)        
Govt expen_int_(t-1)   0.206*        
    (0.079)        
min wage_(t-1)    0.277***       
     (0.000)       
migration_(t-1)     -0.659 -0.167 -0.079 -0.204   
      (0.152) (0.602) (0.784) (0.273)   
excess CB_(t-1)         0.003*  
         (0.072)  
net gini_(t-1)          -0.004** 
          (0.027) 
education_HS, MS, LS      0.445*** -0.134*** -0.044*   
       (0.002) (0.001) (0.083)   
wage share_(t-1) 0.721*** 0.553*** 0.767*** 0.686*** 0.747*** 0.611*** 0.695*** 0.645*** 0.737*** 0.707*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
wage share_(t-2)  -0.041*      0.118***   
   (0.098)      (0.000)   
Hansen_pval 0.192 0.121 0.215 0.471 0.052 0.337 0.001 0.001 0.325 0.099 
AR1_pval 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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AR2_pval 0.982 0.515 0.989 0.346 0.935 0.913 0.740 0.411 0.467 0.984 
Instruments 37 54 38 37 39 31 40 48 45 39 
Sectors 300 242 300 191 259 259 259 254 300 300 
F-test 12.326 21.651 10.455 5.113 15.016 48.854 23.172 141.260 13.472 13.509 
Observations 3284 6075 3284 1880 2833 2833 2833 2524 3189 3284 
F-test year dummies 0.154 0.016 0.340 0.454 0.068 0.589  0.111 0.133 0.141 
Period 97-07 73-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 
Notes: ‘wage share_(t-1)’ reflects the lagged dependent variable, i.e. the wage share of high-, medium-, low-skilled or all workers depending on the skill-group. Specification 
(9) uses a different measure of the capital stock as discussed in the text. The dependent variable is the sectoral adjusted wage share. Estimation method is ‘difference GMM’ 
(Arellano and Bond 1991) with Windmeijer small sample error correction and one instrument column per variable (collapse option). HS, MS and LS stands for high, medium 
and low skilled workers. P-values below the estimation coefficients in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Hansen_pval stands for the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions for all instruments. AR1 and AR2_pval is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments denote the number of instruments used. Sectors, F-test and Observations is the number of cross sections, 
the p-value of the F-test and the number of observations. F-test year dummies is the p-value of the Wald test on the joint significance of all year dummies. 
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Table 5: Economic significance 
 Variables Percentage of explained change in the wage share, based on Specification (5), 
Table 2 
growth 1.99% 
TFP 42.71% 
ICT 3.69% 
nonICT -4.78% 
offshore OECD -0.52% 
offshore East -17.08% 
offshore RoW 44.01% 
offshore total 26.41% 
UD 22.88% 
Sum 92.89% 
Notes: a negative value indicates that the variable contributed to an increase of the wage share over the sample 
period 
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Appendix 
Table A1 – Sectoral classification and skill taxonomy 
Description ISIC3 code for 
estimations 
1970-2007 
ISIC4 code for 
estimations 
2008-2014 
Skill classification 
(IMF, 2007) 
Manufacturing    
Food products, beverages and tobacco 15-16 10-12 low 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products 17-19 13-15 low 
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 20  low 
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 21-22  high 
Wood and paper products; printing and reproduction of 
recorded media 
 16-18 high 
Chemicals and chemical products 24 20-21 high 
Rubber and Plastics 25  high 
Other Non-Metallic Mineral 26  high 
Rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic 
mineral products 
 22-23 high 
Basic metals and fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
27-28 24-25 low 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 29 28 high 
Electrical and optical equipment 30-33 26-27 high 
Transport equipment 34-35 29-30 low 
Manufacturing, n.e.c; Recycling 36-37 31-33 low 
    
Services    
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply E D-E high 
Construction F F low 
Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair Of Motor Vehicles 
and Motorcycles 
 G low 
Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel 
50  low 
Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of 
Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 
51  low 
Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods 
52  low 
Hotels and Restaurants H I low 
Transport and storage 60-63 49-52 high 
Post and Telecommunications 64  high 
Postal and courier activities  53 high 
Telecommunications  61 high 
Publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities  58-60 high 
IT and other information services  62-63 high 
Financial Intermediation J K high 
Renting of Machinery and Equipment and Other 
Business Activities 
71-74 M-N high 
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Table A2: Skill disaggregation in the WIOD Socio-Economic Accounts 
Skill classification Description 
Low Up to lower secondary or second stage of basic education 
Medium Up to Post-secondary non-tertiary education 
High First and Second stage of tertiary education 
Source: Erumban, et al., (2016) 
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Table A3: Baseline Appendix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 
skill group All LS        
growth -0.270*** -0.067***  -0.050 -0.167 -0.215* -0.209 -0.193 -0.285* 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.708) (0.214) (0.087) (0.103) (0.105) (0.057) 
TFP -0.032*** -0.005  -0.053 -0.082 -0.085 -0.040 -0.045  
 (0.000) (0.246)  (0.265) (0.209) (0.218) (0.453) (0.140)  
TFP_(t-1)   -0.005       
   (0.962)       
ICT 0.003 0.001 -0.003     0.006  
 (0.195) (0.388) (0.789)     (0.318)  
ICT_(t-1)    -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.002   
    (0.753) (0.700) (0.612) (0.716)   
nonICT -0.002 -0.007** -0.033 -0.053 -0.022 -0.018 -0.042 -0.007  
 (0.787) (0.017) (0.538) (0.149) (0.543) (0.631) (0.231) (0.481)  
offshoring OECD     -1.293*     
     (0.078)     
offshoring 
OECD_(t-1) 
-0.108* 0.041      -0.389**  
 (0.056) (0.145)      (0.010)  
offshoring East      -0.792    
      (0.730)    
offshoring  
East(t-1) 
0.369 -0.083      2.036*  
 (0.237) (0.594)      (0.054)  
offshoring RoW       1.695   
       (0.157)   
offshoring 
RoW_(t-1) 
0.050 0.010     -2.902* 0.097  
 (0.742) (0.895)     (0.051) (0.730)  
offshoring total    -1.503*      
    (0.070)      
offshoring 
total_(t-1) 
   1.186*      
    (0.079)      
union  
density_(t-1) 
0.044** -0.012  0.113** 0.091** 0.079** 0.062 0.007 0.069* 
 (0.035) (0.234)  (0.014) (0.018) (0.044) (0.139) (0.807) (0.099) 
wage share_(t-1) 0.730*** 0.673*** 0.665*** 0.713*** 0.653*** 0.618*** 0.742*** 0.931*** 0.622*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
wage share_(t-2)   -0.060**       
   (0.028)       
constant 0.328*** 0.056***      0.250**  
 (0.000) (0.000)      (0.023)  
Hansen_pval   0.155 0.795 0.169 0.045 0.327 0.003 0.193 
AR1_pval   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2_pval   0.678 0.537 0.495 0.666 0.856 0.922 0.236 
Instruments   22 30 30 30 30 58 18 
Sectors 300 295 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
F-test 261.959 577.128 17.823 12.861 13.788 11.616 9.160 178.173 22.849 
Observations 3584 3524 3879 3284 3561 3561 3284 3584 3848 
F-test year 
dummies 
0.584 0.000 0.567 0.390 0.435 0.378 0.573 0.710 0.371 
Period 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 
Notes: The dependent variable is the sectoral adjusted wage share. ‘wage share_(t-1)’ reflects the lagged 
dependent variable, i.e. the wage share of high-, medium-, low-skilled or all workers depending on the skill-
group. We use the within estimator in specification (1) and (2), and the system GMM estimator in specification 
(8), otherwise estimation method is ‘difference GMM’ (Arellano and Bond 1991) with Windmeijer small 
sample error correction and one instrument column per variable (collapse option). HS, MS and LS stands for 
high, medium and low skilled workers. P-values below the estimation coefficients in parenthesis. ***, **, * 
denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Hansen_pval stands for the p-value of 
the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions for all instruments. AR1 and AR2_pval is the p-value of the 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments denote the number 
of instruments used. Sectors, F-test and Observations is the number of cross sections, the p-value of the F-test 
and the number of observations. F-test year dummies is the p-value of the Wald test on the joint significance of 
all year dummies.  
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Table A4: Further sector differentiation 
 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
skill group HS MS LS All LS All HS MS LS All All LS 
sector type Manu Manu Manu Manu LS Manu LS Manu HS Serv Serv Serv Serv LS Serv HS Serv HS 
growth -0.044 -0.236* -0.143* -0.214 -0.081 -0.257 0.029 -0.027 -0.050 -0.252** -0.081 -0.083 
 (0.484) (0.064) (0.066) (0.120) (0.272) (0.273) (0.628) (0.693) (0.434) (0.024) (0.564) (0.187) 
TFP 0.024 -0.052 0.010 -0.192** 0.015 -0.026 0.020 -0.077* 0.016 -0.058 -0.192** 0.012 
 (0.473) (0.311) (0.769) (0.017) (0.696) (0.771) (0.500) (0.060) (0.567) (0.207) (0.020) (0.787) 
ICT   0.009 -0.103***   0.004  0.006   0.011 
   (0.287) (0.010)   (0.473)  (0.277)   (0.151) 
ICT_(t-1) 0.001 -0.003  0.083** 0.013 -0.013  0.001  0.005 -0.010  
 (0.877) (0.663)  (0.010) (0.133) (0.576)  (0.872)  (0.726) (0.475)  
nonICT 0.014 -0.035 -0.018 -0.130** -0.013 -0.064 0.029 -0.046* 0.007 0.007 -0.118* 0.005 
 (0.599) (0.347) (0.617) (0.033) (0.714) (0.455) (0.213) (0.098) (0.758) (0.807) (0.097) (0.871) 
offshoring OECD_(t-1) -0.715*** -0.023 0.043 0.187 -0.206 0.389 1.065 0.991 0.215 1.405 0.767 -0.116 
 (0.008) (0.932) (0.867) (0.685) (0.478) (0.424) (0.166) (0.305) (0.741) (0.767) (0.370) (0.807) 
offshoring East_(t-1) 0.943 -1.709 0.017 -2.852 0.313 -2.755 2.403 -9.786 -1.219 9.192* 2.158 3.230 
 (0.265) (0.303) (0.989) (0.462) (0.794) (0.533) (0.867) (0.446) (0.876) (0.060) (0.906) (0.556) 
offshoring RoW_(t-1) -1.739*** 0.665 -0.776 -0.123 -0.894 -2.502* -0.132 0.814 -0.012 0.067 0.387 -0.088 
 (0.007) (0.508) (0.228) (0.951) (0.292) (0.094) (0.750) (0.294) (0.973) (0.987) (0.576) (0.770) 
union density_(t-1) -0.110*** 0.061 0.159*** 0.136 0.201*** 0.123 -0.049 0.023 0.042 -0.160 0.013 0.034 
 (0.004) (0.180) (0.001) (0.140) (0.001) (0.277) (0.168) (0.594) (0.300) (0.192) (0.886) (0.467) 
education_HS 0.027      0.143      
 (0.820)      (0.137)      
education_MS  -0.116***      -0.126***     
  (0.008)      (0.003)     
education_LS   -0.053*  -0.050    -0.065***    
   (0.068)  (0.179)    (0.006)    
wage share_(t-1)    0.459***  0.441**    0.808*** 0.590***  
    (0.000)  (0.036)    (0.000) (0.002)  
wage share_HS_(t-1) 0.408**      0.309      
 (0.021)      (0.169)      
wage share_MS_(t-1)  0.569***      0.866***     
  (0.000)      (0.000)     
wage share_LS_(t-1)   0.707***  0.737***    0.675***   0.811*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)   (0.000) 
wage share_LS_(t-2)   0.136***  0.129**    0.127***    
   (0.001)  (0.013)    (0.000)    
Hansen_pval 0.529 0.142 0.215 0.806 0.490 0.384 0.397 0.079 0.476 0.295 0.263 0.329 
AR1_pval 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.141 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 
45 
 
AR2_pval 0.994 0.607 0.158 0.568 0.213 0.488 0.520 0.754 0.737 0.186 0.136 0.941 
Instruments 37 37 36 36 36 36 37 37 36 36 36 36 
Sectors 166 166 166 98 98 68 134 134 129 67 67 62 
F-test 44.031 16.636 123.797 14.236 99.300 8.676 26.968 27.406 85.004 23.677 10.028 57.075 
Observations 1816 1816 1650 1072 974 744 1468 1468 1284 734 734 679 
F-test year dummies 0.013 0.163 0.974 0.074 0.902 0.388 0.593 0.385 0.114 0.507 0.450 0.155 
Period 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 97-07 
Notes: The dependent variable is the sectoral adjusted wage share. ‘wage share_(t-1)’ reflects the lagged dependent variable, i.e. the wage share of high-, medium-, low-
skilled or all workers depending on the skill-group.  Estimation method is ‘difference GMM’ (Arellano and Bond 1991) with Windmeijer small sample error correction and 
one instrument column per variable (collapse option). HS, MS and LS stands for high, medium and low skilled workers. P-values below the estimation coefficients in 
parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Hansen_pval stands for the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions for all instruments. AR1 and AR2_pval is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments denote 
the number of instruments used. Sectors, F-test and Observations is the number of cross sections, the p-value of the F-test and the number of observations. F-test year 
dummies is the p-value of the Wald test on the joint significance of all year dummies. 
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Table A5: Additional variables 
 1 fem. share 2 female share 3 female share 4 female share 5 govt 6 min wage 7 min wage 8 excess CB 9 non-FDI 10 FDI 
skill group All HS MS LS All All All All All All 
growth -0.408*** -0.080 -0.179*** -0.122** -0.199*** -0.288*** -0.198** -0.187*** -0.144*** -0.300*** 
  (0.000) (0.107) (0.002) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
TFP -0.085 -0.009 -0.053 -0.008 -0.107** -0.035 -0.202** -0.293*** -0.201*** -0.114 
  (0.140) (0.880) (0.179) (0.747) (0.020) (0.548) (0.011) (0.000) (0.002) (0.128) 
ICT -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 0.007  -0.007 -0.036*** -0.025*** -0.024** -0.027** 
  (0.404) (0.299) (0.365) (0.250)  (0.489) (0.002) (0.000) (0.016) (0.027) 
ICT_(t-1)     0.004      
      (0.284)      
nonICT -0.034 -0.003 -0.032 -0.021 -0.114*** -0.043 -0.167*** -0.274*** -0.210*** -0.030 
  (0.387) (0.939) (0.275) (0.342) (0.004) (0.299) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.553) 
offshoring OECD_(t-1) -0.545 -0.903* -0.402 0.927*  0.142     
  (0.346) (0.051) (0.501) (0.052)  (0.800)     
offshoring East_(t-1) 1.615 1.870 1.464 0.392  4.757*     
  (0.493) (0.226) (0.173) (0.756)  (0.089)     
offshoring RoW_(t-1) -1.888 -1.720 -1.602** 0.431  -1.898*     
  (0.177) (0.149) (0.047) (0.710)  (0.095)     
union density_(t-1) 0.037 -0.048 0.013 0.044 0.076*  0.063 0.172*** 0.107*** 0.101 
  (0.500) (0.148) (0.686) (0.366) (0.054)  (0.248) (0.000) (0.007) (0.179) 
fem. share_(t-1) -0.571**          
  (0.016)          
fem. share HS_(t-1)  0.001         
  (0.229)         
fem. share MS_(t-1)   -0.003        
    (0.208)        
fem. share LS_(t-1)    -0.324***       
     (0.002)       
Govt expen_(t-1)     -0.153**      
      (0.023)      
Govt expen_int_(t-1)     0.256***      
      (0.004)      
min wage      0.275*** 0.246***    
       (0.000) (0.000)    
excess CB_(t-1)        -0.000   
        (0.685)   
non-FDI flows_(t-1)         -0.071***  
         (0.009)  
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outward FDI_(t-1)          0.003 
           (0.757) 
inward FDI_(t-1)          0.009 
          (0.419) 
education HS, MS, LS  0.128* -0.068** 0.005       
   (0.065) (0.023) (0.864)       
wage share_(t-1) 0.663*** 0.239 0.857*** 0.629*** 0.606*** 0.677*** 0.717*** 0.532*** 0.603*** 0.484*** 
  (0.000) (0.323) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
wage share_(t-2)    0.132*** -0.079***  -0.058** -0.072*** -0.067***  
     (0.000) (0.003)  (0.030) (0.000) (0.004)  
Hansen_pval 0.048 0.062 0.578 0.100 0.042 0.542 0.119 0.223 0.058 0.160 
AR1_pval 0.000 0.156 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.004 
AR2_pval 0.343 0.550 0.963 0.048 0.972 0.365 0.630 0.305 0.600 0.134 
Instruments 48 40 40 39 52 36 47 57 54 50 
Sectors 242 242 242 237 300 191 191 300 300 166 
F-test 12.762 27.422 44.870 107.738 15.373 5.521 13.630 25.142 32.026 14.548 
Observations 2419 2419 2419 2134 5228 1880 3878 7647 7645 2090 
F-test year dummies 0.027 0.200 0.087 0.084 0.001 0.590 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.012 
Period 97-07 97-07 97-07 98-07 73-07 97-07 73-07 73-07 73-07 72-07 
Notes: The dependent variable is the sectoral adjusted wage share. ‘wage share_(t-1)’ reflects the lagged dependent variable, i.e. the wage share of high-, medium-, low-
skilled or all workers depending on the skill-group.  Estimation method is ‘difference GMM’ (Arellano and Bond 1991) with Windmeijer small sample error correction and 
one instrument column per variable (collapse option). HS, MS and LS stands for high, medium and low skilled workers. P-values below the estimation coefficients in 
parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Hansen_pval stands for the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions for all instruments. AR1 and AR2_pval is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments denote 
the number of instruments used. Sectors, F-test and Observations is the number of cross sections, the p-value of the F-test and the number of observations. F-test year 
dummies is the p-value of the Wald test on the joint significance of all year dummies. 
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Table A6: Additional variables (continued) 
 1 LMI 2 CB 3 CB 4 Gini 5 non-FDI 6 FNC-inter 7 FNC 8 HHD 9 IMP 10 IM-EX 
growth -0.204*** -0.177*** -0.352*** -0.193*** -0.242* -0.320** -0.148 -0.182*** -0.406*** -0.324** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.064) (0.016) (0.144) (0.001) (0.001) (0.027) 
TFP -0.236*** -0.247*** -0.054 -0.201*** -0.045 -0.054 -0.201** -0.294*** -0.092 -0.061 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.263) (0.003) (0.285) (0.229) (0.034) (0.000) (0.138) (0.259) 
ICT -0.039*** -0.029** -0.008 -0.011 -0.002 -0.001 -0.013 -0.034*** -0.004 -0.001 
  (0.008) (0.034) (0.294) (0.219) (0.821) (0.906) (0.319) (0.007) (0.661) (0.899) 
ICT_(t-1) 0.019*          
  (0.099)          
nonICT -0.198*** -0.201** -0.029 -0.099* -0.046 -0.049 -0.088 -0.278*** -0.056 -0.049 
  (0.005) (0.030) (0.391) (0.097) (0.175) (0.151) (0.121) (0.000) (0.176) (0.231) 
offshoring OECD_(t-1)   -0.716  -0.476 -0.547   0.399 0.905 
    (0.226)  (0.306) (0.208)   (0.548) (0.141) 
offshoring East_(t-1)   3.636*  3.827 0.833   0.693 4.511 
    (0.069)  (0.134) (0.679)   (0.723) (0.194) 
offshoring RoW_(t-1)   -2.831***  -2.871** -1.374   -0.695 -0.247 
    (0.006)  (0.033) (0.129)   (0.422) (0.832) 
union density_(t-1) 0.144*** 0.171*** 0.071 0.115*** 0.043 0.075 0.095 0.201*** 0.120** 0.133*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.119) (0.009) (0.400) (0.117) (0.114) (0.000) (0.020) (0.007) 
LMI_(t-1) -0.001          
 (0.824)          
collective bargaining_(t-1)  -0.000 -0.000        
  (0.608) (0.306)        
net gini_(t-1)    -0.001       
    (0.467)       
non-FDI flows_(t-1)     -0.041      
     (0.193)      
financial intermediation_(t-1)      -0.389     
      (0.368)     
FINPAY_(t-1)       -0.035    
       (0.621)    
FININC_(t-1)       0.055    
       (0.429)    
HHD_(t-1)        0.000   
        (0.354)   
capital imports OECD_(t-1)         0.697  
         (0.603)  
capital imports East_(t-1)         0.212  
         (0.165)  
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capital imports RoW_(t-1)         0.066  
         (0.681)  
capital imports all_(t-1)         1.071**  
         (0.028)  
cons. imports. OECD_(t-1)         0.042  
         (0.617)  
cons. imports East_(t-1)         -0.109  
         (0.684)  
cons. imports RoW_(t-1)          0.016 
          (0.928) 
cons. imports all_(t-1)          0.151 
          (0.155) 
exports OECD_(t-1)          -0.241 
          (0.194) 
exports East_(t-1)          -0.643 
          (0.208) 
exports RoW_(t-1)          -0.470* 
          (0.052) 
wage share_(t-1) 0.644*** 0.588*** 0.712*** 0.640*** 0.769*** 0.744*** 0.598*** 0.535*** 0.672*** 0.723*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
wage share_(t-2) -0.057*** -0.076***  -0.048*   -0.017 -0.094***   
  (0.006) (0.001)  (0.050)   (0.544) (0.000)   
Hansen_pval 0.182 0.055 0.453 0.020 0.417 0.057 0.119 0.012 0.172 0.589 
AR1_pval 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
AR2_pval 0.760 0.785 0.469 0.777 0.986 0.954 0.437 0.162 0.859 0.487 
Instruments 57 51 37 54 39 39 38 54 54 51 
Sectors 300 300 300 300 300 300 256 300 300 300 
F-test 35.036 33.774 13.314 28.478 10.365 11.365 18.334 22.322 11.679 9.264 
Observations 7835 7429 3189 7479 3284 3284 3102 7018 3284 3284 
F-test year dummies 0.008 0.016 0.102 0.056 0.130 0.305 0.058 0.001 0.439 0.252 
Period 70-07 70-07 95-07 70-07 95-07 95-07 70-07 70-07 95-07 95-07 
Notes: The dependent variable is the sectoral adjusted wage share. ‘wage share_(t-1)’ reflects the lagged dependent variable, i.e. the wage share of high-, medium-, low-
skilled or all workers depending on the skill-group.  Estimation method is ‘difference GMM’ (Arellano and Bond 1991) with Windmeijer small sample error correction and 
one instrument column per variable (collapse option). HS, MS and LS stands for high, medium and low skilled workers. P-values below the estimation coefficients in 
parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Hansen_pval stands for the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions for all instruments. AR1 and AR2_pval is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments denote 
the number of instruments used. Sectors, F-test and Observations is the number of cross sections, the p-value of the F-test and the number of observations. F-test year 
dummies is the p-value of the Wald test on the joint significance of all year dummies. 
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Table A7: Descriptive statistics and sources 
Variable definition Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Source 
wage share =
labour compensation
value added
 10191 0.698 0.163 0.072 1.467 EU KLEMS 
wage share(high − skilled) =
labour compensation(high−skilled)
value added
  3895 0.160 0.088 0.014 0.539 EU KLEMS 
wage share(medium − skilled) =
labour compensation(medium − skilled)
value added
 3895 0.331 0.117 0.033 0.754 EU KLEMS 
wage share(low − skilled) =
labour compensation(low − skilled)
value added
 3830 0.180 0.108 0.003 0.596 EU KLEMS 
ICT =
ICT services
real value added
 9811 0.008 0.025 8.09*10-8 0.455 EU KLEMS 
nonICT =
non − ICT services
real value added
 9811 0.019 0.039 6.13*10-7 0.475 EU KLEMS 
TFP = Total Factor Productivity 8852 88.954 24.572 3.595 278.861 EU KLEMS 
growth = ∆ln (real value added) 10335 0.026 0.064 -0.413 0.616 EU KLEMS 
union density =
union members
total employees
 10142 0.419 0.255 0.011 1.321 ICTWSS 5.1 
offshoring OECD =
offshoring to OECD countries
gross output
 4004 0.032 0.046 3.11*10-6 0.308 WIOD 
offshoring East =
offshoring to Eastern Europe
gross output
 4004 0.002 0.004 3.73*10-8 0.034 WIOD 
offshoring RoW =
offshoring to the rest of the world
gross output
 4004 0.008 0.013 4.02*10-7 0.137 WIOD 
female share =
hours worked by women
total hours worked
 6888 0.294 0.146 0.016 0.778 EU KLEMS 
Govt =
in − kind social government expenditure and cash transfers
total government spending
 5918 0.546 0.058 0.406 0.642 OECD 
min wage =
minimum wages
average labour compensation per person engaged
 5274 0.383 0.185 0.105 1.877 
OECD & EU 
KLEMS 
migration =
foreign born labourforce
total labour force
 5962 0.051 0.037 3.18*10-4 0.168 OECD 
excess bargaining coverage =
collective bargaining coverage
union density
 9548 3.095 4.413 0.368 48.556 ICTWSS 5.1 
Gini (net) 10494 28.229 4.355 17.964 37.816 SWIID 
Wage income of the top 1 percent of income earners 4048 0.529 0.113 0.306 0.815 
World Wealth 
and Income 
Database 
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non − FDI flows
GDP
 10780 1.907 2.549 0.133 24.679 
External 
Wealth of 
Nations 
FDI outflows
gross output
 2463 0.020 0.116 -1.497 1.264 OECD STAN 
FDI inflows
gross output
 2534 0.017 0.100 -1.301 1.740 OECD STAN 
 
